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Radio frequency identification (RFID) has spread into
many fields. Its security and privacy has received more
and more attention. Based on traditional authentica-
tion protocols, some other branches related to practical
applications have been introduced including server-less
authentication and searching protocols. The server-less
searching protocol is extended from server-less authenti-
cation protocol and both of them are executedwithout the
support from the backend servers. Through analyzing
some proposed protocols, we found that the probabilistic
tracking attack is one of the major threats on the server-
less RFID security protocols. The probability of being
tracked and the cost on computation are related with the
probability of the undesired tag’s response. Based on
the analysis, a practical conclusion is given which can be
used in most of the server-less RFID systems.
Keywords: RFID, server-less, authentication, searching,
security
1. Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) has been
widely used in many fields, such as pharmaceu-
ticals industry and logistics management. At
present, RFID has been embedded into daily
life. However, there is still hidden trouble
in the security and privacy of RFID systems.
Hence the authentication protocols have been
presented by many researchers to guarantee the
security and privacy involved in RFID systems.
At the beginning, the RFID security protocols
were only used to check whether the tag is le-
gal, i.e. one-way protocol. Afterwards, with
deepening of understanding on the RFID sys-
tem by malicious adversaries or users, read-
ers can be utilized by them to violate the le-
gal users’ privacy. Considering this situation,
a large amount of mutual authentication pro-
tocols were proposed. Based on these works,
the grouping proof protocols were presented to
ensure that some of the entities are scanned si-
multaneously. It is obvious that the security of
these protocols is totally based on the central
database. In other words, there has to be a cen-
tral server connected with the readers constantly
to realize a secure system. However, steady
connection between the back-end database and
the readers cannot be guaranteed in many prac-
tical scenarios, especially in the remote areas.
Therefore, server-less security protocol is nec-
essary. Among these server-less security proto-
cols, the server-less RFID searching protocol is
extended from the authentication protocol. The
RFID searching protocol is used by the reader
to determine whether the desired tag is in the
group of tags.
The main contributions of this paper are: (i)
the requirements for server-less RFID search-
ing protocols are studied, (ii) the analysis of the
relationship between the probabilistic tracking
attack, the cost on computation and the parame-
ter  , and (iii) a conclusion is put forward in this
section that can be used in most of the server-
less RFID systems to optimize the performance
of the systems.
2. Related Work
RFID technology firstly appeared during the
World War II. Since then, it has been used in
many practical fields. With its wide usage,
RFID security is of the popular interest. The
first approach to protect RFID users’ privacy is
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the implementation of “Kill” [5]. That means
the Reader sends a command of kill the tag and
the tag will be inactive forever. In this way,
privacy can be well protected from an adver-
sary’s scanning the tag illegally. But the tag
will never work anymore. Afterwards, accord-
ing to the thought of cryptography presented by
Shannon, a number of researchers came up with
manyRFIDprotocols for privacy and security of
RFID system. Such is the Hash-Lock protocol
[12, 13]. Weis S. A. et al. (2002) also described
a new research direction in RFID for researchers
with cryptography. A randomized Hash-Lock
protocol [17] was put forward, and the authors
said that low-cost Radio Frequency Identifica-
tion (RFID) systems would become pervasive
in our daily lives when affixed to everyday con-
sumer items as “smart labels”. It predicts that
low-cost is important for RFID system’s being
applied in our daily life. The hash-chain proto-
col [10] can ensure forward-secure privacy, be-
cause hash-function has one-way property. In
some of the early protocols, both of the par-
ties might use security schemes with static IDs
[8]. However, these security schemes have been
proved to be insecure. Tsai et al. [16] presented
their own dynamic ID scheme to achieve secu-
rity and anonymity based on the work of Yoon et
al. [18]. With the help of central database, most
security requirements are realized by many pro-
tocols. In this section, a detailed introduction
on sever-less protocols will be presented.
The idea of “server-less” was firstly shown by
Tan et al. [15]. It was introduced in a practical
scenario where a truck driver was dispatched to
pick up some merchandise attached with RFID
tags. Nevertheless the driver only has a PDA
(Personal Digital Assistant) as a reader, with-
out connection with central database for his re-
mote location. Alternatively, it is to download
the list of necessary information of the tags.
But whether the PDA is stolen cannot be guar-
anteed. So an authentication protocol imple-
mented only by readers is the best way to solve
the problem. Tan et al. proposed several mu-
tual authentication protocols and searching pro-
tocols without central database. Besides, they
created a contact list which has been used in
subsequent works. In 2008, some excellent pro-
tocols were presented by Ahamed et al. Some
researchers put forward a server-less searching
protocol and a server-less authentication proto-
col separately [1, 2]. These researches indicated
that RFID security protocols without servers
would be very meaningful for the development
of RFID system [4]. The development of server-
less RFID security scheme, analysis on security,
privacy, anonymity, etc. has raised people’s at-
tention [11]. Then, in 2011, Myneni et al. [9]
proposed an anonymous protocol while Kim et
al. [6] added untraceability in their own proto-
col. Sundaresan et al. [14] combined server-less
searching protocols with low-cost RFID tags,
which can narrow the range of research and en-
hance practicability of protocols. Lee et al. [7]
analyzed some previous works on the numeri-
cal values firstly. Then, they proposed their own
protocols to try to enhance security and privacy.
Through analyzing the existing server-less pro-
tocols, we find that probabilistic tracking attack
is a serious threat. We find out the key of proba-
bilistic tracking attack and provide an effective
solution to resist this attack.
3. Security Requirements on Sever-less
RFID Searching Protocol
Server-less RFID protocol is usually operated
in some remote area where the connection be-
tween the reader and the backend server may be
not steady. This problem could influence the se-
curity of RFID systems which need continuous
support from the servers
Besides forward security, privacy, anonymity
and some other existing security targets for all
RFID security protocols, some other require-
ments should be reached for server-less RFID
searching protocol:
1. Higher stability of the reader. It means that
to perform server-less RFID searching pro-
tocols, the readers’ ability has to be much
more robust to keep the systems steady.
2. Limited scalability of the system. A tag can-
not join the process of operation of RFID
searching protocol until the reader commu-
nicates with the trusted party, which means
the scalability is strictly limited.
3. Limited recoverability of the tag. When a
tag does not pass through the authentication
between itself and its corresponding reader
for a threshold times, the reader will keep
the tag in record and it will not communi-
cate with the tag. Only after the reader has
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connected with the trusted party can the tag
be authenticated by its reader.
Overall, high efficiency and security is the ul-
timate goal for a server-less RFID searching
protocol.
4. Analysis of the Probabilistic Tracking
Attack
Most of the server-less RFID searching proto-
cols can be summarized to the framework below
(Figure 1). The protocol proposed by Lee et al.
(Figure 2) is taken as an example to demonstrate
our analysis more clearly in this paper.
1. The reader broadcasts the active information
which includes a random number, its identity
and an encryption result of the fresh infor-
mation and the shared keys with the desired
tag to all the tags.
2. The desired tag will give a response with
probability of 1 while the undesired tags will
reply with a probability of  .
3. When the reader receives the responses from
the tags, it will check and reply to the tags.
4. The desired tag will check the message from
the reader to authenticate it.
4.1. Notations in Lee et al.’s Server-less
Protocols
In the paper, we created some new notations
besides the ones used in Lee et al.’s server-less
authentication and searching protocols. The no-
tations are shown in Table 1.
4.2. Lee et al.’s Server-less Searching
Protocol
Lee et al.’s protocol is used in the scenario when
there is no continuous support from the server,
which is shown in Figure 2 in details.
Figure 1. Framework for most of the server-less RFID searching protocols.
Figure 2. Lee et al.’s server-less searching protocol.
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Ri, ri ri is the identity of an RFID reader Ri
Ti, idi idi is the identity of the i th tag Ti
randl A random number with length l
randjl The j
th random number with length l
nr The random number generated by the reader
nt The random number generated by the tag
S The trusted back-end server
ki The i th secret key shared by T i and S
h(),f() Two one-way hash functions
h()m The m bits in the left of h()
Li The reader-specific access list downloaded from S
idj Id for RFID tag Tj
i, j different indexes of tags or readers
CA Trusted party, responsible for authenticating readers and deploying tags
Lij The j th item for Tj in contact list Li, i.e. the j th line in Li
Loldij The value of Lij before refreshing
Lnewij The value of Lij after refreshing
N The total number of tags in the group
Chash The cost of one hash operation
Table 1. Notations in the protocol.
1. The reader broadcasts nt, h(kj‖idj‖nr‖nt‖ri)
to the tags.
2. When T∗ receives the message from the
reader, T∗will compute the valueh(kT∗‖nr‖ri)
and checkwhether the value ofh(kT∗‖nr‖ri)l⊕
h(kj‖nr‖ri)l ⊕ idj equals its identity; if so, it
will go to 3a, otherwise, it will go to step 3b.
3a. The desired tag Tj will send the message
nt, h(kj‖idj‖nr‖nt‖ri) to the reader.
3b. The undesired tag T∗ will send the message
nt, randl with probability  .
4. After receiving the response from the tags,
the reader will send h(ri‖idj‖nr‖nt‖kj) to the
Tj or randl to the T*.
5. Tj computes and checks whether h(ri‖idj‖nr
‖nt‖kj) equals the value received in step 4.
If so, it will accept the reader. Otherwise, it
will terminate the session.
5. Analysis of the Searching Protocol
5.1. Definition
The protocols presented by Lee et al. would
suffer from probabilistic tacking.
In searching protocol, when a tag is not the
desired one, it will reply to the reader with a
probability  . Thus, the probability of some
tags’ response can be calculated.
There are two circumstances where we calcu-
lated the values of the tracking probability and
the overhead of computing hash function on the
verifier.
We make a detailed definition on the variables
mentioned above.
Definiton 1: the random event that there is the
desired tag among the N tags is denoted as C.
C’s opposite event that there is no desired tag
among the N tags is denoted as C̄.
When N is very large, that can be seen as in-
finity, we define the probability of event C and
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event C̄ as below:




We will analyze the two different circumstances
from two aspects, as following. We make de-
tailed description for these two cases.
Situation 1: it is a special case. It is certain
that there is the desired tag in the group in many
circumstances, such as the reader queries for a
tag for a second time before updating.
Situation 2: it is uncertain whether the desired
tag is in the group of tags or not. This is the
most frequent case.
5.2. Probabilistic Tracking
Tracking means distinguishing one tag from the
others by obtaining the same or related infor-
mation from different sessions about the tag.
As we all know, an unmatched tag will reply
with probability  and not reply with probabil-
ity (1 −  ). In this way, when there is only
one response in the wireless channel, it maybe
comes from the undesired tag with the probabil-
ity of  Suppose that a malicious adversary has
already recorded the query of the response and
he is patient enough to send the same query over
and over again. At the same time he keeps mon-
itoring the number of responses transmitted in
the wireless channel. When there is only one re-
sponse again, the adversary tracks successfully
with some probability. We will denote the prob-
ability as pt. Suppose M is the random event
that when there is only one response in the chan-
nel, it comes from the desired tag and pm is the
probability of the random event. U represents
the random event that none of the undesired tags
gives any response. pu is the probability that the
other unmatched tags do not answer the query
from the reader.
We can get an equation:
pt = pm · pu (2)
Situation 1: from the definition of situation 1,
we will get:
pm = 1 (3)
pu = (1 −  )N−1 (4)
So,
pt = pm · pu = (1 −  )N−1 (5)
In this way, the average number of times that







(1 −  )N−1 (6)
Situation 2: in this situation, whether the de-
sired tag is in the group of tags or not is not cer-
tain. P(Ui) (i = 1, 2) is the probability that the
other unmatched tags do not answer the query
from the reader under random event C or C̄.
P(M|C) means the probability of the case that
there is only one response and it comes from the
desired tag when the desired tag is in the group.
P(M|C̄) represents the probability of the case
that there is only one response and it comes
from the desired tag when the desired tag is not
in the group.
pt = P(Ttrack|C) · P(C) + P(Ttrack|C̄) · P(C̄)
= P(M|C) · P(U1) · P(C)
+ P(M|C) · P(U2) · P(C) (7)
Where,
P(M|C) = 1 (8)
P(M|C̄) = 0 (9)
P(U1) = (1 −  )N−1 (10)





(1 −  )N−1 (12)
In this situation, the average number of times







(1 −  )N−1 (13)
Since the scale of tags may be very great, i.e. N
is large, n is rather large, which means the ad-
versary has to replay the same query many times
to reach success with some probability. But it
is feasible because of computer technology. So
the probability pt cannot be negligible.
In a server-less RFID system, the probability
of being tracked and the cost on authentication
are both influenced by the value of  . With
an increasing  , the probability of being traced
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will be reduced while the cost on authentica-
tion adds up The property associated with 
mentioned before is one of the characteristics
of the framework. Because of this property, x
is introduced as the weight of security in the
comprehensive assessment of the system per-
formance. Besides, a parameter S can be used
to evaluate the performance of the system, and
S can be expressed as the following equation
S = 1 − (x · pt + (1 − x) · m) (14)
wherem represents the normalized performance








· N ·  + 1
2
· (1 + (N − 1) )
)
(15)
Above all, performance of the system can be
expressed as the equation below:






(1 −  )N−1
)






· N ·  + 1
2
· (1 + (N − 1) )
))
(16)
The empirical model is visualized by using mat-
lab, as shown in Figure 3. From the figure, it
can be seen that the performance of a system
will reach the peak in the darkest place of the
curve. Because  and x are both variable, con-
trolling variables method is adopted. With this
method, we analyzed two different cases. They
are the case where  is fixed and the case where
x is fixed.
Firstly,  is fixed ( is set as 0.5), and the prob-
ability of being tracked, cost on computation
and the performance of the system are shown
in Figure 4a. In this case, the operator of the
system can adjust the system as he wants.
Secondly, x is fixed (x is set as 0.5) and the
probability of being tracked, cost on compu-
tation and the performance of the system are
shown in Figure 4b. It can be seen from the
figure that the performance of the system rises
to its peak rapidly and goes down with the in-
crease of  . The operator can adjust the system
as he wants.
Above all, the tendency of the system’s perfor-
mance related to x and  can be seen clearly
from the figures above. The parameters can be
adjusted by the system’s owner according to the
system’s ability and requirements.
6. Conclusion
In our paper, a detailed analysis of the exist-
ing server-less RFID searching protocols pro-
posed by Lee et al. is shown. From our anal-
ysis, we find that probabilistic tracking cannot
be ignored. Especially with the help of high-
tech computer, probability tracking may be a
great security threat. In the future, we will do
a deep research on server-less RFID searching
protocols, to lower the existing security threat
and reach the requirements on server-less RFID
searching protocol.
Figure 3. Performance of the system.
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Figure 4a.  is fixed.
Figure 4b. x is fixed.
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